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Introduction
hapter 10 of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations1
is concerned with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the
extent that the use of these weapons, other than nuclear, will impinge on naval
warfare (except in connection with naval surface and naval air bombardment of
land objectives, riverine operations, etc.) is probably fairly limited, the draftsmen
of the Handbook have deemed it appropriate to include a full chapter on these
subjects-and rightly so. In addition to discussing the evolution and present
status of the applicable rules of the international law of war with respect to each
of those categories of weapons, this commentary will discuss the extent to which
those rules affect naval warfare qua naval warfare and the extent to which they
affect the operations of naval units against objectives on land.

C

Nuclear Weapons
When the first atom bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, it
began a new (and perilous) era for the planet Earth. It also began a controversy
which has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of a great many people.
Not unexpectedly, sometime after the facts with respect to the nature of the
atom bomb and the extent of the casualties and damage inflicted at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki became generally known, an issue was raised as to the legality or
illegality of the use of the atom bomb-and, subsequently, the same issue was,
of course, raised as to the use of its far more powerful and devastating successors.
In the discussion which follows it must be borne in mind that while there are a
number ofconventions placing various types ofrestrictions on nuclearweapons,2
there is no convention which specifically outlaws their use. 3 In light of the
complete failure of all of the practically endless efforts undertaken since 1945 to
accomplish this result, to argue that the use of such weapons is prohibited by
inference derived from the provisions of international agreements dating from
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1868, from 1899, or from 1907, appears to be the equivalent of tilting at
windmills. In view of the foregoing this writer concurs with the statement
contained in the Handbook to the effect that, "There are no rules of customary
or conventional intemationallaw prohibiting nations from employing nuclear
weapons in armed conflict.,,4 Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the arguments pro
and con appears to be warranted.
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War,
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes WeightS contained a number of
humanitarian preambular clauses:
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of
men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment ofarms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws
of humanity.

During the course of the drafting of what became the 1899 Hague Convention
(II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land6 and its annexed
Regulations, several provisions were included which have often been cited as
affecting the subject under discussion. These provisions were:
Art. 22. The right of belligerents to adopt means ofinjuring the enemy are not
unlimited.
Art. 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is
especially forbidden:
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons; ...
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous
injury; ...

The cognate provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed Regulations are essentially
identical with those quoted above?
Realizing, however, that these and the other provisions that were to be
included in the Regulations could not possibly cover all of the contingencies that
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might arise during the course of a war, the Russian representative at the 1899
Peace Conference, Martens, a noted international lawyer, proposed, and the
Conference agreed, that a paragraph be included in the preamble which would
read:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the
requirements of the public conscience.8

Assuming that these preambular provisions are law-making in nature, a
number of questions arise. Did the use of the atomic bombs in 1945 weaken
the military forces of the enemy? Did it uselessly aggravate the sufferings of
disabled men, or render their death inevitable? Did it exceed the limits which
a belligerent may adopt as a means of injuring the enemy? Did it constitute the
use of "poison"? Did it represent the employment of a weapon "calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering"? Did it constitute a failure to give the populations
and belligerents "the protection and empire of the principles of international
law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience" to which
they were entided? And, most important, if one or more of these questions is
answered in the affirmative, does the particular principle apply if the alternative
would have resulted in a million American military casualties and an even greater
number of Japanese casualties, military and civilian? In other words, was the
principle of proportionality applicable?9 While all of those questions have been
posed here with respect to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they will likewise have to
be asked-and answered-before any future use of nuclear weapons.
Literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on both sides of
the questions posed and it is doubtful that any proponent of either side of the
argument has been successful in convincing anyone who disagrees with his
position that it is correct and that the other person's position is incorrect. The
present writer does not propose to draw himself into that quagmire. Suffice it
to say that nuclear weapons are with us and at the present time there does not
appear to be any possibility that they will disappear, at least in the foreseeable
future. Under those circumstances we can only hope that neither side will make
the mistake of using them and thus bring an end to civilization, and to life itself,
on this planet.
There is, of course, an area of nuclear warfare in which navies would play an
important role. A preemptive first strike by one side might possibly eliminate
much of the other side's land-based nuclear deterrent force--but it could not
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reach the deployed naval-based force, the submarines of which are the
ever-mobile carriers of nuclear ballistic missiles. Thus, this potential naval
retaliatory force, maintained by both parties involved in the eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation which has more or less existed since shortly after the end ofWorId
War II, is a major factor in the policy of deterrence. Moreover, the strength and
speed of these nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines are reputedly
such that there are experts who believe that they can only be destroyed by nuclear
weapons, such as nuclear-armed depth charges or nuclear-armed torpedoes. If
such is the case, the use ofthese latter nuclear weapons becomes almost inevitable
as during a period of active hostilities, whether we call it war or armed conflict,
no nation and no navy is going to permit enemy nuclear-powered submarines
armed with nuclear ballistic missiles to roam the seas unchallenged.
One problem which arises is whether successful conventional-weapons
attacks on nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (and surface vessels)
would adversely affect the waters of the oceans and the air of the atmosphere.
While the United States has lost two nuclear submarines with no such adverse
effects, this is far from conclusive as the two crews would probably have shut
down the nuclear reactors and any nuclear weapons aboard the submarines
would not have been armed; accordingly, the amount of radioactivity released
by each of those vessels would have been minimal. How much environmental
damage would be caused by the sinking ofa nuclear armed and nuclear-powered
submarine with its reactor in operation appears to be a relative unknown.
Moreover, should a war reach the nuclear stage, it is a virtual certainty that any
naval engagement would include the use of nuclear weapons against the
opposing enemy fleets. When this occurs the extent of the contamination of the
oceans and of the atmosphere is incalculable as nuclear explosions would be
taking place both in the atmosphere and in the water and nuclear-powered ships
10
would be sunk with their reactors in operation. Of course, should a war reach
the nuclear stage, such matters would be a small, and comparatively unimportant,
part of the overall picture.
The ballistic missiles carried by nuclear-powered submarines, referred to
above, would, of course, if used, be directed against objectives on land. It is
doubtful, but not inconceivable, that in a nuclear war a naval bombardment of
objectives on land might include nuclear-armed shells and missiles. However,
should a war reach that stage, the results of any such bombardment would be
miniscule compared to the results that could be expected from landbased nuclear
ballistic missiles, from the nuclear ballistic missiles released from below the
surface of the seas, and from the nuclear weapons dropped from the air.
It is probably necessary to conclude that if and when an armed conflict
approaches the nuclear stage, law will playa very small role in determining the
actions of the belligerents.
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Chemical Weapons

Chemical warfare agents have been defined as "chemical substances, whether
gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic
effects on man, animals and plants."l1
The earliest formal international attempt to prohibit the use of chemicals in
warfare occurred at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference which drafted and
adopted a Declaration stating, "The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from
the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or
deleterious gases. ,,12 This Declaration was ofunlimited duration. All ofthe major
European Powers, including France, Germany, Russia, and the United
Kingdom, signed and ratified it. The United States neither signed nor ratified
it.
The 1899 Declaration was in force during World War I. Despite this,
Germany used gas against the Russians in Poland in January 1915. The gas was
delivered by artillery shells but, because of the sub-zero weather, had little effect
and the incident passed almost unnoticed. 13 The first major, and
well-documented, use of gas occurred in France, on April 22, 1915, when the
Germans opened containers of compressed chlorine, permitting a favoring wind
to blow the gas towards the Allied Ypres salient. 14 The success of the operation
15
far exceeded expectations and before the war was brought to an end more
than three years later many other chemical weapons were being used by both
sides and were being delivered by artillery, mortars, projectors, etc. 16 The Treaty
of Versailles, which legally terminated World War I as between Germany and
the Allies, contained the following provision:
Art. 171. The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation
are stricdy forbidden in Gemlany.
The same applies to materials speciall! intended for the manufacture, storage
1
and use of the said products or devices.

The 1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments,
consisting of representatives of France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, drafted a treaty which was primarily concerned with
submarine warfare but which included the following provisions:
Art. 5. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been jusdy condemned by the
general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been
declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,
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The signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally
accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice
of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as
between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto. IS
To become effective this treaty required the ratification of all of the participants
in the Conference. France refused to ratifY it because of objections to some of
the provisions with respect to submarine warfare. Accordingly, the treaty never
entered into force. However, three years later another conference, this one
concerned with international trade in weapons and ammunition, drafted the
1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asph~ating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and ofBacteriological Methods of Warfare. 9 While
much of its wording was taken almost verbatim from the prior draftings, its
importance warrants the setting forth ofits operative provisions in their entirety:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general
opinion of the civilized world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which
the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of
International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to
Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this
prohibition to the use ofbacteriological methods ofwarfare and agree to be bound
as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.
Strange to relate, while the United States had ratified the Washington Treaty,
with its provision prohibiting the use of poisonous gases, just two years earlier,
and was the chief proponent of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it did not ratifY the
latter until 50 years later, in 1975!
Many of the states which have ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol have done
so with a so-called "first use" reservation. Typical of those reservations is that
of the United Kingdom: "The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His
Britannic Majesty toward any Power at enmity with him whose armed forces,
or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in
the Protocol. ,,20 It does not appear that this "first use" reservation has ever been
invoked despite the not-infrequent use of the prohibited gases. For example,
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Italy, a party to the Protocol (as was Ethiopia), admittedly used poison gas in its
1935-1936 war with Ethiopia. Japan, although a party to the 1899 Declaration,
did not ratify the Protocol until after World War II. OnJune 5, 1942, President
21
Roosevelt warned the Japanese against the use of poisonous gas. While at that
time Japan denied using such gas in China,22 it has never officially denied such
use since the end of the war. Egypt, a Party to the 1925 Protocol (as was the
Yemen Arab Republic), is alleged to have used gas in the civil war in Yemen.
Iraq, also a party to the Protocol (as is Iran), has been accused of using gas in its
23
recent war with Iran. In none of these cases is there evidence of retaliation in
kind, probably because the victim of the gas attack was not in possession of a
stock of chemical weapons.
During World War II Hitler on occasion considered the use of chemical
weapons against England. However, he apparently realized, or his military
advisers were able to convince him, that Germany's opponents were well able
to reply in kind and that, in the long run, the use of such weapons would be
self-defeating to Germany?4 On June 5, 1943, President Roosevelt warned
Germany that the use of chemical weapons by any Axis country against anyone
of the United Nations would result in "swift retaliation in kind," specifying that
the targets would be "munition centers, seaports, and other milita~ objectives
throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis country." 5 With the
possible exception ofJapanese use in China, chemical weapons were not used
26
by any belligerent during World War 11.
The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a number of
27
resolutions on the subject of chemical warfare. A resolution adopted in 1968,
among other things, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the
assistance of experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological)
28
weapons. This report, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1969,
found that "because of the scale and intensity of the potential effects of their use,
they are considered as weapons of mass destruction.,,29 The report contained
the follo\ving statement:
The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines.
Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict
how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of
. and t eh
·
. which we live. 30
SOCIety
enVIronment
In
Upon the receipt of that report the General Assembly adopted a resolution to
the effect that the 1925 Geneva Protocol "embodies the generally recognized
rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflict of
all biological and chemical methods of warfare.,,31 Of course, this merely
represented the political judgment of those nations which voted in favor of the
resolution.
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The need to maintain a supply of chemical weapons for use in retaliation
against a violator of the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or any other
"first user," has created the longtime problem of finding a safe method for the
disposition of overage gas, with leaky containers adding to the difficulties of the
possessor. One technical advance in this field, the so-called "binary" gases, will
considerably alleviate this problem. These gases consist of two non-toxic
chemicals which only become toxic when mixed, an action which is
accomplished while, for example, an artillery shell is in flight. A representative
of the Chemical Corps of the United States Army listed the advantages of binary
weapons as including "improved safety during production, transportation and
storage; no requirement for high-cost toxic production facilities; and simplified
':::""!1!
••
proced ures. ,,32
Iow-cost d eUlllltanzatlon
A number of problems have arisen with respect to the interpretation of the
1925 Geneva Protocol. One such problem is whether it includes within its
prohibitions the use of smoke, sometimes a major weapon in naval warfare, and
the use of riot control agents, such as lachrymatories, or tear gas. The argument
against the use of smoke, that it at least temporarily incapacitates due to a type
of asphyxia, is weak and is not very frequendy advanced. Originally the British
interpreted the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol as covering
33
lachrymatories. However, deeming it an essential weapon for use in Northern
Ireland, in 1970 the British Government took the position that "CS and other
such gases" were not prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol.34 Practically all
governments use lachrymatories domestically for the suppression of such events
as riots and other civil disturbances. Nevertheless, the propriety of their use in
armed conflict remains a matter of dispute.
A further problem of interpretation is whether the Protocol includes within
its prohibitions the use of herbicides. This problem arose during World War II
when the question was raised as to whether it would be in accordance with
international law to use "crop-destroying chemicals" on the gardens being
grown by Japanese units located on by-passed islands of the Pacific. Although
the JUdge Advocate General of the Army found no legal impediment to such
action,3 no action was taken, probably because it would have been a waste of
resources. During the hostilities in Vietnam herbicides were used extensively,
both for crop destruction and as a defoliant?6 When the issue was raised in the
Senate during the consideration by that body of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense arrived at the same conclusion
the Army had reached in 1945?7 Nevertheless, as will be noted below, the
United States has renounced the first use of herbicides except for certain
extreme1y limi·te d purposes. 38
Another such problem of interpretation is whether incendiary weapons are
within the prohibitions of the Protocol. The United States has long taken the
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position that there is no rule ofinternationallaw prohibiting the use ofincendiary
weapons?9 At a conference of experts convened in 1969 by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, some of the experts were of the opinion that the
use ofincendiary weapons, and particularly napalm, was prohibited by the 1925
Geneva Protocol because, by burning the oxygen, it "causes a sort of asphyxia."
Others took the position that incendiary weapons were not prohibited but were
subject to "discriminating" use. The ICRC concluded that "more extensive
studies should be made of the consequences of incendiary weapons in order to
reach a clear legal solution as to their employment.,,40 The U.N. Report with
respect to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, published that same
year, contains the following relevant statement:
We also recognize that there is a dividing line between chemical agents of
warfare, in the sense in which we use the tenns, and incendiary substances, such
as napalm and smoke, which exercise their effects through fire, temporary
deprivation ofair or reduced visibility. We regard the latter as weapons which are
better classified with high explosives than with the substances with which we are
concerned. They are therefore not dealt with further in this report. 41
Studies were subsequently made by a group of experts appointed by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Stockholm Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), and by the ICRC itselfin 1973, in 1974, and in 1976; and
probably by other organizations and institutions. The U.N. experts found it
appropriate "to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of
working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development
and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons,,42- a clear indication
of their understanding that there was no such prohibition then extant. The
author of the SIPRI report stated that "there was never any positive indication
that the intention of the [1925] Geneva Protocol was to prohibit incendiaries. ,,43
The ICRC studies were inconclusive. 44 Finally, the subject was discussed by
the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts45 and the Diplomatic
Conference adopted a resolution in which it recommended the convening of a
conference to draft agreements on certain conventional weapons. 46 Such a
conference was held in 1980 and resulted in, among others, a Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary Weapons. 47 This Protocol
does not prohibit the use of incendiaries; it merely places certain restrictions on
the manner in which they may be used. The sum total to be derived from the
foregoing survey is, of course, that incendiary weapons do not come within the
purview of the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or, for that matter, of
any other international agreement on the law of war.
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The 1980 Protocol provides that it is prohibited "to make the civilian
population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by
incendiary weapons." (Of course, the law of war generally prohibits such attacks
by any weapon!) Such a prohibition, and the accompanying restrictions on the
use of air-delivered and other types of incendiary weapons intended to
implement that prohibition, would obviously have no effect on naval
engagements at sea. However, they would be applicable with respect to naval
bombardments ofland targets, either by warships or by aircraft, and with respect
to the use of incendiaries by marines ashore.
Now let us see where the United States stands generally on the question of
chemical warfare. It has already been mentioned that the United States did not
ratify the 1899 Declaration and that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was not ratified
by it until 1975. During that 50-year interim period the position of the United
States with respect to chemical warfare was well summed up in the predecessor
to the Handbook, which contained the following statement:
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or
restricts the use in warfare of poisonous or asphyxiating gases or of bacteriological
weapons. Although the use of such weapons frequendy has been condemned by
states, including the United States, it remains doubiful that, in the absence oj a spedfic
restriction established by treaty a state legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their
use. However, it is clear that the use of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons
may be considered justified against an enemy who first resorts to the use of these
weapons. [Footnotes omitted]48

The United States has almost uniformly taken the ~osition that there is no
4
customary law prohibiting the use of these weapons. During the hostilities in
Vietnam the United States used two controversial types of chemical weapons so
tear gas and herbicides. Tear gas was originally used for humanitarian
purposesS 1 but its utility as a non-lethal ~ quickly became apparent and it was
widely used for a number of purposes. 2 This created considerable discussion
both in the United States and elsewhere in the world with the result that on
November 25,1969, President Nixon issued a statement in which he said that
he was resubmitting the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification and that the United States "Reaffirms its oft-repeated
renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons" and "Extends this
renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals."S3
Mter extensive hearings and further commitments by the Executive Branch,
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the 1925 Geneva
ProtocolS4 and President Ford ratified it on January 22, 1975. The ratification
was deposited, and the Protocol became binding .on the United States, on April
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10, 1975. On April 8, 1975, President Ford signed Executive Order 11,850
which provides:
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of
herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use,
for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their
immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except
in defensive military modes to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and
distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask
or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of
downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and
·
..
55
paramili tary orgaruzatlons.

Fortunately, since the issuance of that Executive Order, the United States has
not been involved in any armed conflict which would make its application
appropriate. However, the Handbook, issued in 1987, further illuminates the
United States position with respect to the use of chemical weapons. It will be
recalled that its predecessor, The LAw oj Naval Warfare, stated that it would be
difficult to hold that use of such weapons was prohibited by customary
internationallaw. 56 In a complete turnabout, the Handbook says:
The United States considers the prohibition against first use of lethal and
incapacitating chemical weapons to be part of customary international law and,
therefore, binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas
Protoco1.57

It will be interesting to record the reactions to this position of states which are
still not parties to the 1925 Protocol and which have not committed themselves
58
in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
As we shall see, there is in existence a Convention which supplements the
1925 Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, and
stockpiling of biological agents and their delivery weapons.59 Although separate
proposals made in 1962 by both the Soviet Union and the United States included
similar provisions with respect to chemical weapons,60 both the United
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Kingdom and the United States later insisted on separating chemical weapons
from the others. As a result, despite fairly continuous efforts, the only restriction
on chemical weapons at the present time is the 1925 Geneva Protocol which
prohibits use only.
In 1984 then Vice President Bush went to Geneva to attend a meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) and to table a United States proposal which
sought to accomplish for chemical weapons what had already been accomplished
for biological weapons. 61 It has since been under consideration in the CD, which
62
subsequently drafted and studied a 1987 revision. In January 1989 a conference
hosted by the French Government in Paris adopted a resolution calling for
reaffirmation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and stressed "the necessity of
concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the
development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on
their destruction. ,,63 In July 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union
64
reached agreement on the key remaining issues and currently (December
1989) the CD is working on a May 1989 version65 with changes made up to
15 October 1989.66 In view of the insistence of the United States on
"anywhere-anytime" inspections, it is ofinterest to know that the Soviet Union
has agreed to permit "surprise inspections" and that it is now the United States
which has a problem in this respect in view of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures. ,,67
The wheels of diplomacy grind slowly (witness the years of discussion of the
1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and of the 1977 Protocols68), so there
is still the possibility that in the not-too-distant future there will be agreement
on a Convention which will prohibit the development, production and
stockpiling of chemical agents and their delivery systems, as well as providing
for the destruction of all such chemical agents now in the arsenals of parties to
. 69
suc h a C onventJ.on.

Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons
Bacteriological (biological) 70 weapons have been defined as "living
organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which
are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which
depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant
attacked.,,71 International restrictions on the use of biological weapons present
far fewer legal problems than do those on the use of chemical weapons. In fact,
the legal situation is so clear that the major problem is, once again, that of
ensuring compliance.
It will be recalled that by the declaration contained in the 1925 Geneva
Protocol the Parties agreed "to extend the prohibition [against the use of
poisonous gas] to the use of bacteriological methods ofwarfare.,,72 The League
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of Nations Disarmament Conference discussed the matter and attempted, albeit
unsuccessfully, to draft a treaty which would have prohibited the production
and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons. During World War
II considerable scientific research was done on biological weapons. However,
no such weapons were used by either side, with one possible exception. The
Soviet Union has long contended that during World War II the Japanese had a
unit called "Bacteriological Detachment 731" located at Harbin in China and
that this unit had conducted bacteriological experiments on several thousand
Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and, perhaps, Americans. When the war ended,
many of the senior officers of this unit were taken into Soviet custody and in
December 1949 twelve of them were tried by a Soviet court at Khabarovsk,
were found guilty of engaging in bacteriological warfare, and received sentences
of confinement in a labor correction camp for terms varying from two to
73
twenty-five years. In 1982 the ~:;ranese Government acknowledged that such
a unit had existed during the war. Assuming that the Soviet charges are correct,
it would appear that the activities of the Japanese unit never passed the
experimental stage, that it never reached the stage of actual use of biologicals
against enemy military forces as a weapon of war.
In 1962 the Soviet Union tabled at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) a proposal for general and complete
disarmament which included the following provision: "The prohibition, and
destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological
and radiological weapons.,,75
A few weeks later the United States submitted its counterproposal with a
provision which called for "Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,
bacteriological, and other weaEons of mass destruction and cessation of the
production of such weapons.,,7
In view of the close similarity of the two proposals, it would seem that
agreement with respect at least to chemical and biological weapons could have
been quickly attained.77 However, such was not the case. There were those
who took the position that chemical and biological weapons should not be joined
in the same treaty as there was experience with chemical weapons, but none
with biologicals. While the relevance of this argument is far from clear, it was
sufficient to delay the affirmative action which might otherwise have been taken.
Finally, in 1969 the United Kingdom submitted a proposal which called for a
complete ban on "microbial or other biological agents," but made no mention
of chemical weapons?8 When, in 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union
tabled identical drafts79 relating to biologicals only, the result was a foregone
conclusion. Using that draft as a working document the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament (CCD, which had replaced ENDC) produced a
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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
. 8°
.
..
D estructlon. 1ts most Important provlSlon states:
Art. 1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

It also contains provisions requiring each State Party to destroy all of the items
specified in Article 1 within nine months of the Convention coming into force
(presumably, for the State concerned); and an undertaking not to transfer to any
recipient, or to encourage the manufacture of, any of the prohibited items.
It is thus evident that States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to the
1972 Bacteriological Convention are prohibited from developing, manufacturing,
stockpiling, acquiring, retaining, or using biological weapons In view ofthe coverage
of the Convention, nations have not made "first use" reservations. The two
international agreements were intended to, and should eliminate biologicals
from the arsenals of all such Parties and should mean that in any future war, large
or small, limited or unlimited, conventional or unconventional, biologicals
would not be a factor. Unfortunately, events have already demonstrated that
these expectations will not be met.
A catastrophe occurred in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1980 in which
more than 1,000 people died as a result of what appears to have been anthrax
poisoning, although Soviet officials claimed that the deaths had been caused by
meat contaminated by hoof-and-mouth disease. 81 In addition, the United States
has contended that the Soviet Union, either direcdy or through surrogates, has
used biolog!cal (as well as chemical) weapons in Southeast Asia and in
82
Afghanistan. If, as is generally believed, the Sverdlovsk incident involved
anthrax, and if, as the United States contends, biologicals have been used by the
Vietnamese in Kampuchea and Laos and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
then the Soviet Union is manufacturing and using biologicals contrary to the
provisions of the two agreements to which it is a party. Unfortunately, the 1925
Geneva Protocol contains no provision for verification and the only provision
for verification contained in the 1972 Convention is a meaningless one providing
for resort to the Security Council.

NBC Weapons

261

The predecessor to the Handbook, published at a time when the United States
was not a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and when the 1972 Bacteriological
Convention had not yet been drafted, stated:
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or
restricts the use in warfare ... of bacteriological weapons. Although the use of
such weapons frequendy has been condemned by states, including the United
States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction established
by treaty, a state le~y is prohibited at present from resorting to their use.
[Footnotes omitted.] 3

This was probably a fair statement of the United States position until November
25, 1969, when President Nixon, on behalf of the United States, renounced the
use of biological weapons b~ this country.84 Three months later he included
8
toxins in this renunciation. Then this country became a party to the 1972
Bacteriological Convention and in 1975 it finally ratified the 1925 Geneva
Protocol with its ban on the use of biologicals. Once again, however, it appears
that the Handbook may be going too far when it asserts:
The United States considers the prohibition against the use of biological
weapons during armed conflict to be part of customary intemational law and
thereby binding on all nations whether or not they are farties to the 1925 Gas
8
Protocol or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

Can it be that while at a particular point in time a principle may not necessarily
be a binding rule of customary international law, it becomes such as soon as the
United States ratifies a treaty containing that principle? Certainly, the United
States did not consider itself bound by any rule of customary international law
prohibiting the use of biologicals when it issued its military manuals in 1955 and
1956; nor did it consider itself so bound at any time thereafter, even when (and
until) President Nixon made his 1969 and 1970 statements unilaterally
renouncing the use of biologicals and toxins. Would the 50 or more nations
which are not parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 50 or more nations
which are not parties to the 1972 Bacteriological Convention agree with the
quoted statement? Or is this statement, and the similar one with respect to
chemical weapons quoted above, inserted in order to convince non-parties that
they might just as well ratify the agreements as they are bound by them in any
event?
In view of the mobility of naval forces, it has always been considered unlikely,
but not impossible, that naval vessels at sea will have to meet the problem of
defending themselves against an attack using biological (or chemical) weapons.
Should such an attack occur, for example by guided missiles which succeed in
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penetrating the vessel's defenses and dispense the lethal item, the attack would
have a devastating effect because air-intake systems would quickly disseminate
it throughout the interior of the vessel, or because concurrent high-explosive
ordnance would have pierced the shell of the ship. Items such as masks, special
clothing, etc., available for the protection of the individual members ofthe crew,
would gready impede the functioning of the crew, even if there was time to
don them. In addition, naval vessels, naval guns and naval aircraft might well be
among the weapons systems used for the delivery of biologicals against land
targets, should biologicals ever be used in wartime. Thus, in a field trial, a ship
sailing 16 kilometers offihore travelled a distance of 260 kilometers parallel to
the coastline discharging a harmless powder. The resulting aerosol covered an
area of over 75,000 square kilometers. Had the material disseminated been a
biological "depending on the organism and its degree of hardiness, areas from
5,000 to 20,000 square kilometers could have been effectively attacked, infecting
a high proportion of unprotected people in the area. ,,87
Conclusions

There is no law in force, conventional or customary, which prohibits the use
of nuclear weapons. However, there can be no winners, but only losers, no
victors, but only vanquished, in the event of a nuclear war. Whether or not a
war in which nuclear powers are involved becomes a nuclear war will depend
upon the wisdom and leadership of the political leaders of those powers and
upon the extent to which the desire to win the war outweighs a reluctance to
bring disaster not only upon the enemy, but also upon their own people and
upon the peoples of neutral nations.
Chemical and biological weapons, like nuclear weapons, are weapons of mass
destruction. Once released they are beyond the control of the user and, like
nuclear weapons, their effects can come back to haunt the user. The use of
certain chemicals can have widespread, long-lasting, and severe consequences
for the environment and for the populations. This is even more true with respect
to the use of many biologicals. The use of either of these types of weapons is
prohibited by an international agreement to which more than two-thirds of the
nations of the world community are parties. The very existence of biological
weapons is prohibited by an international agreement with a similar amount of
participation. Hopefully, there will, in due course, be an identical prohibition
with respect to chemical weapons.
In view of the tremendous lethal and destructive capabilities of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons one might almost regret our inability to
tum the clock back to the nineteenth century, when nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, as we now know them, were not even a gleam in a
scientist's eyes.
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Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

Addendum

In 1971 there was drafted a Treaty on the Prohibition ofthe Emplacement ofNuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
and the Subsoil ThereoJ. The United States is a Party to this Treaty.
In 1972 the United Nations Committee on Disannament drafted a Convention
on tIle Prohibition of tIle Development, Production and Stockpiling of Baderiological
(BiologicaQ and Toxin Weapons and on their Destrudion which was approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States has ratified this
Convention, as have the great majority of other States. All types of
bacteriological and biological weapons are now completely banned and each
State is given nine months from the date of the entry into force of the
Convention within which to destroy all such weapons in its stockpile.
(presumably this means nine months after the Convention enters into force for
a particular country.) The Convention itself entered into force on 26 March
1975. As is not unusual, Iraq is believed to continue to possess such weapons
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and has placed constant difficulties in the way of the United Nations inspectors
who have attempted to ascertain whether it is complying with the terms of the
1991 Security Council Resolution (S.C. Res. 687) requiring their destruction,
as well as that of chemical weapons.
In 1993 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a Convention
on the Prohibition !if the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use !if Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction. This Convention supplements the 1925 Geneva
Gas Protocol which merely prohibited "use." Once again, Iraq is believed to
continue to possess such weapons and has placed constant difficulties in the way
of the United Nations inspectors who have attempted to ascertain whether it is
complying with the terms of Security Council Resolution 687. (The United
States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty on 24
April 1997, despite the vehement opposition of Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and President Clinton ratified it
on 25 April 1997. Unfortunately, the ratification includes a number of
"understandings," many of which will not coincide with the interpretations of
other Parties to the Convention.)
On 15 December 1994 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
a resolution in which it requested the International Court ofJustice to provide
an advisory opinion on the question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstances permitted under international law?" The Court decided
unanimously that "There is in neither customary nor conventional international
law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and by
a vote of eleven to three that "There is in neither customary nor conventional
international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons as such." However, a further holding of the Court, on
which the vote was seven to seven, decided by the President's casting vote,
states:
It follows from the above mentioned requirements that the threat or use ofnuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable
in anned conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements
of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat
or use ofnuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.

